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Abstract
As Moore’s law continues to reduce the cost of computation at an exponential rate, embedded
computing capabilities spread to ever-expanding application scenarios, such as smartphones, the
Internet of Things, and automation, among many others. This trend has naturally caused the
underlying technology to evolve and has introduced increasingly complex microarchitectures into
embedded processors in attempts to optimize for performance. While other microarchitectures,
like those used in personal computers, have been extensively studied, there has been relatively less
research done on embedded microarchitectures. This is especially true in terms of their security,
which is growing more important as widespread adoption increases. This thesis explores an un-
documented cache behavior found in ARM Cortex processors that we call implicit cache lockdown.
While it was presumably implemented for performance reasons, it has a large impact on the re-
cently popular class of cybersecurity attacks that utilize cache-timing side-channels. These attacks
leverage the underlying hardware, specifically, the small timing differences between algorithm exe-
cutions due to CPU caches, to glean sensitive information from a victim process. Since the affected
processors are found in an overwhelming majority of smart phones, this sensitive information can
include cryptographic secrets, credit card information, and passwords. As the name implies, im-
plicit cache lockdown limits the ability for an attacker to evict certain data from a CPU’s cache.
Since this is precisely what known cache-timing attacks rely on, they are rendered ineffective in
their current form. This thesis analyzes implicit cache lockdown in great detail, including the
methodology we used to discover it, its implications on all existing cache-timing attacks, and how
it can be circumvented by an attacker.
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1 Introduction
The advent of smartphones and their state of ubiquity has effected undeniable change in our
daily lifestyles. Accompanied by the growing acceptance and usage of embedded computation,
automation, and the Internet of Things, these devices have triggered a surge in popularity of
embedded microarchitecture technology. Like with the processors found in personal computers,
the microarchitectural designs of smartphone and IoT processors have been rapidly evolving to
keep pace with the unending demand for increased performance by consumers.
These devices—smartphones and IoT gadgets in particular—have consistent access to sensitive
data. With peripherals like cameras and microphones, usage habits like secure web browsing, on-
line shopping, mobile banking, and email, and the myriad of applications that require user account
registration, sensitive data on these devices can include photos, voice recordings, cryptographic
keys, bank account and credit card information, and passwords. In addition, there is a plethora
of personal information in these devices, such as a user’s location, schedule, contacts, and commu-
nication history and metadata. Users expect these information sources to be kept secure and the
data itself private, despite the emergence of surveillance capitalism.
However, compared to the processors in desktop computers, these embedded processors have
not been studied as extensively with respect to security research, especially in regards to microar-
chitectural attacks. In fact, only very recently has there been research into microarchitectural
attacks that leverage cache-timing side-channels on these processors. These types of attacks are
particularly harmful on these devices due to their ability to recover user-sensitive information.
1.1 Microarchitectural Attacks
Side-channel attacks are those that target not the theoretical foundation of a system, but instead
the various anomalies that arise due to its physical implementation. Common examples involve
measuring the power consumption, EM radiation, or timing variations of a computer processor.
When analyzed appropriately, these measurements can be used to infer the specific data the com-
puter is operating on, including the aforementioned sensitive user information. A cache-timing
side-channel attack is one in which the attacker leverages the timing differences between multiple
executions of a victim’s algorithm. More specifically, the timing differences between memory ac-
cesses across executions; whether the CPU fetched data from a fast internal cache or from slow
DRAM reveals whether that data was recently used. By cleverly selecting which data she is timing,
the attacker can infer what instructions and on what data the victim core is executing.
For a majority of the time since they were first proposed decades ago, cache-timing attacks
have been only studied theoretically. However, these types of attacks have gained significant
popularity throughout the last few years, in part due to the advent of cloud computing and the
new realistic attack scenarios it brought about. Traditionally, research into these attacks have
focused on desktops and servers, which generally have Intel processors. Since these attacks target
specific microarchitecture designs, they cannot trivially be applied to processors with different
architectures. Indeed, it was only in 2016 that we saw the first attacks on ARM processors
in mobile phones [LGS+16, ZXZ16]. There were many challenges that needed to be overcome
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in order to successfully transfer cache-timing attacks to ARM. Among them were the relative
sparseness of inclusive caches in ARM processors, finding reliable cache eviction strategies despite
nondeterministic cache replacement policies, and the lack of both a dedicated unprivileged timing
source and cache flush command. However, it was not realized until this thesis that an additional
challenge must be overcome to systematically mount cache-timing attacks on ARM: circumventing
a behavior that we call implicit cache lockdown.
Now that these challenges, with the exception of implicit cache lockdown, have been method-
ically defeated, we expect to see an increase in cache-timing research on ARM processors and
the devices that utilize them. It is imperative that researchers devise novel defense mechanisms
against these attacks, that may or may not be inspired by implicit cache lockdown. Otherwise,
there stands to be significant consequences in terms of consumer well-being due to the great po-
tential of information that attackers can steal from embedded devices.
1.2 Contribution
We have discovered implicit cache lockdown, an undocumented yet impactful feature found in
modern ARM Cortex processors. In short, this feature prevents CPU cores from evicting data
allocated by a different core from the shared L2 cache. The affected hardware includes at least the
ARM Cortex-A7, A15, A53, and A57 processors, but we suspect it extends to the other Cortex-A
processors, and possibly even further. In 2016, more than 65% of all smartphones shipped with a
Cortex-A processor, and another 20% shipped with a different ARM processor [Kah].
While likely implemented for performance reasons, which by itself may be worth studying, the
resulting behavior of implicit cache lockdown significantly affects a majority of existing cache-
timing side-channel attacks. This is because these attacks precisely rely on the ability to evict
data from another core’s cache; before timing cache accesses, attackers must remove the target
data from the cache to see if, indeed, the victim core brings them back into cache. Implicit
lockdown, as the name implies, prevents this data from being evicted in such a manner. Data are
”locked down” by the core that allocated them, so attackers can no longer manipulate the victim
core’s cache contents to their will. This means an attacker will have a harder, but not impossible,
time conducting her attacks. In this light, implicit lockdown serves as a possibly unintended
countermeasure. The only cache-timing attacks that remain unaffected are only applicable in
ARMv8, the newest ARM architecture, which did not start being incorporated into smartphone
processors until 2014. During the decade before that, virtually all smartphone processors used the
ARMv7 architecture, and these are still widely circulated among consumers.
ARM Holdings, the company behind ARM intellectual property, publishes technical reference
manuals (TRMs) for each of its processors, as well as architecture reference manuals and program-
ming guides for each version and market segment of its architecture designs. We did not find any
mention of implicit cache lockdown in these documents. While we did find documentation for
programmable lockdown in the TRMs, this is distinct from the topic of this thesis, and does not
have any hidden consequences. We discuss programmable lockdown and its relationship to implicit
lockdown in Section 2.2.5. While there has been work studying the performance applications of
programmable lockdown [PKMF12, FPT07, WHKA13, SCM+14], to our knowledge, this thesis is
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the first public documentation of this undisclosed implicit lockdown behavior in existing processors
and its implications on cache-timing attacks.
In summary, this work discovers an undisclosed feature of ARM processors, thereby providing
a more complete and accurate understanding of applied cache-timing attacks. It was not until
this discovery that we understood why existing cache attacks would only intermittently succeed on
ARM devices. With this increased understanding, we can devise better performing attack methods
and optimizations, which in turn lets researchers develop thorough and appropriate countermea-
sures. Specifically, without the ability to evict cache lines across cores, attackers must develop
techniques to induce self-eviction within victim cores.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. We explain why caches exist in modern
computers, how they operate, and relevant cache design decisions in Section 2. A thorough under-
standing of these topics are fundamental to comprehending our contributions. We give an overview
of debugging on ARM in Section 3, including usage of the ARM DSTREAM debugger that allows
us to visually see inside the caches of a CPU. We review cache-timing attacks in Section 4 by first
briefly discussing their history, and then enumerating and explaining state-of-the-art techniques.
It is crucial to understand how these attacks operate, especially the microarchitectural behavior
they rely on, to fully grasp the impact of our contributions. Implicit cache lockdown in studied in
detail in Section 5; we describe this new behavior, the methodology we used to discover it, how
it interacts with existing cache attacks, and how to circumvent it in that context. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
8
2 Background
In order to understand what implicit cache lockdown is, it is necessary to understand how caches
are used within modern computers. For this reason, we discuss the memory hierarchy of computer
microarchitecture in Section 2.1, as well as fundamental cache design decisions in Section 2.2.
2.1 Computer Architecture
Modern computers operate by having a central processing unit (CPU) execute instructions and
process data specified by a user. In addition to the CPU, modern computers have memory that is
used to store these instructions and data when not being operated on, and input/output peripherals
that allow it to interface with the outside world. A computer’s memory, often referred to as main
memory, is composed of a series of storage units that each have an address and hold a specified
amount of information. Today’s technology allows the CPU to fetch information from main memory
in about 100ns [CPU]. Since the CPU can operate at the gigahertz frequency, applications that
depend on many memory accesses will inefficiently spend most of their time waiting on information
to travel from memory to the CPU.
For this reason, CPUs have caches which provide intermediate storage between main memory
and the CPU. These caches can hold much less information than main memory, and are stored
much closer to the CPU, usually on the same die. For these two reasons, accesses to caches are
significantly faster than main memory, around 1ns [CPU]. Thus, the CPU will first check to see if
the information it requires has been cached, called a cache hit, or if it needs to fetch the information
from main memory, called a cache miss.
Caches are effective because they take advantage of the principle of locality, either in time or
space, exhibited by memory access patterns. Temporal locality refers to the phenomenon that
recently accessed memory will often be re-accessed in the near the future; spatial locality refers
to the phenomenon that memory accesses often occur physically near each other. To capitalize
on these phenomena, the CPU will store information it has fetched from main memory, and
information nearby the piece of information prompting the fetch, in the cache.
In practice, there is generally more than one level of cache between the CPU and main memory.
The highest level of cache–the one closest to the CPU–is the smallest and fastest, and is referred
to as the L1 cache. Each successive level of cache, i.e., the L2, L3, and L4 cache, is larger, farther
from the CPU, and slower. The caches are layered as such to provide a compromise between size
and speed, since larger caches have a greater hit-rate but longer latency. ARM CPUs generally
only have two levels of cache, whereas Intel CPUs generally have three. For performance reasons,
the L1 cache is typically split up into a separate instruction cache (L1I, or I-cache) and data cache
(L1D, D-cache). This allows the CPU to fetch information from both of them at the same. The
lower level caches generally remain unified and hold both instructions and data. In multi-core
systems, it is common that each core will have its own L1 cache, and the lower level caches will be
shared among all cores.
All major operating systems use a technique called virtual memory to give each process its
own entire address space, thereby simplifying application development and increasing security
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via isolation. This introduces the overhead of managing the mappings between every processes’
virtual memory and the physical memory of the computer, which is handled by the memory
management unit (MMU) within the CPU. The MMU splits virtual memory into consecutive
pages of a particular size, each of which can be mapped to any location of physical memory, called
a frame. The MMU will organize these mappings in a page table. In multi-core computers, each
core will have its own MMU. For instance, in ARM processors, pages are 4 KB, and the MMU
can be configured to instead use large pages (64 KB), sections (1 MB) or supersections (16 MB)
as the smallest granule of mapping.
Since processes will operate within their own virtual memory, any time there is a memory access
in any application, the MMU will need to consult the page table to translate the virtual address
into a physical address. For efficiency, the MMU in each core has its own cache of the page table
called the translation lookaside buffer (TLB). Like other CPU caches, the TLB takes advantage
of the principal of locality because processes will often reference many addresses within the same
page through their life cycle. Some microarchitectures may have multilevel TLBs for the same
reasons that most microarchitectures have multilevel caches. For example, the ARM Cortex-A53
has two 10-entry micro TLBs, one for data, one for instructions, and a unified 512-entry main
TLB. However, unlike caches, it is not common for last level TLBs to be shared across cores.
The entire memory hierarchy for an example computer with a quad-core processor, dynamic
random access memory (DRAM) for main memory, and a hard disk drive (HDD) for secondary
storage, is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that as you move down the diagram, each memory block
gets larger in capacity and slower in access speeds.
2.2 Cache Design
The fundamental unit of a cache is the cache line, which is a specified minimum amount of con-
tiguous information that can be inserted into or removed from a cache at a time. A cache line is
several times larger than the minimum amount of information a CPU can process at a time, and
is designed as such to take advantage of spatial locality. Thus, a cache can be viewed simply as
an array of cache lines. Each cache line has an address that describes where in main memory it
belongs.
Given that a cache has significantly less storage than main memory, there must be an efficient
way to determine where in the cache a particular cache line should be placed. There are three
fundamentally similar approaches, namely: direct mapped, set-associative, and fully-associative.
The simplest design, the direct mapped approach, organizes a cache such that any given cache line
can only be placed in a single specific location in the cache, directly determined by bits defined in
the physical address. Alternatively, the cache can be designed such that a given cache line can be
placed in a select few locations; the specific placement is at the discretion of the cache controller
within the CPU. In this case, the cache would be described as N-way set-associative, where N is
the number of possible locations for a given line, called ways. Each set of N ways is aptly referred
to as a set, and the specific set a cache line is to be placed in is determined by bits defined in the
physical address. Lastly, a cache is fully-associative if a given cache line can be placed anywhere
within the cache. In the former two cases, the address bits that determine where in the cache a
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line may be placed, i.e., what set it maps to, is referred to as its index.
Figure 1: Diagram of entire computer memory
hierarchy. The smallest and fastest storage areas
are the caches within each core, closely followed
by the L2 cache outside the cores but within the
CPU. External to the SoC is main memory, often
in the form of DRAM, and the largest and slowest
storage device: hard disk or solid state drives.
In addition to an index, each cache line has
a corresponding tag, which is also specified by
bits of the physical address. The tag is used to
see if the address at a particular index matches
the address that the CPU is looking for during
lookups. This is necessary because multiple dif-
ferent cache lines will map to the same index.
In the case of a fully associative cache, there is
no index, so the CPU will check the tag of every
line in the cache to see if it matches the desired
address. The offset indicates which subset of
bytes of the cache line the CPU is requesting.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these properties
for the Cortex-A15 in the Exynos 5250, which
has 2GB of DRAM and a 1MB 16-way L2 cache
with 64B cache lines [exy, A15]. Memory ad-
dresses 96 and 65632 both map to set 1, but
have differentiating tags. Since it is a 16-way
set-associative cache, 14 more addresses can
map to set 1 before lines must be evicted. Note
that the decomposition in Figure 3 is computed
from the hardware specifications given earlier.
We know the offset is 6 bits long, since that
is enough to fully address the 64B cache line.
Similarly, we know the set number is 10 bits
long, since there are 210 sets:
1 MB cache size
64 B line size
lines
16 lines/set
= 210 sets
The tag then uses the remaining bits.
Depending on the processor, some caches
may be partitioned into banks. Separate banks
within the same cache can be accessed simulta-
neously by different cores, which increases per-
formance, and there can exist multiple levels of
banking. For example, the ARM Cortex A15
has an L2 cache with four tag banks, selected
by bits 6 and 7 of the physical address, and
four data banks within each tag bank, selected by bits 4 and 5 of the physical address. In the
example we give in Figures 2 and 3, the tag bank for each address is 1, and the data bank is 2. In
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Figure 2: Two memory addresses map to the same 16-way L2 set in the Exynos 5250 Cortex-A15.
Up to 16 set-congruent addresses can be stored per set in this cache at one time.
Figure 3: Address decomposition into tag, index, and offset for use in the cache. This information
can be derived from the corresponding technical reference manuals.
this case, since the addresses map to the same banks, there is no performance benefit.
2.2.1 Cache Replacement Policies
When the CPU stores a new line into a cache that is full, it must first choose which cache line
to evict to make room. This choice is governed by the cache’s replacement policy. The ideal
replacement policy would choose the cache line that will not be needed for the longest time, but
since this is usually impossible to know, algorithms such as least recently used (LRU), round robin
(RR), and pseudorandom are used as approximations. See Table 1 for a listing of replacement
policies in ARM Cortex processors.
2.2.2 Cache Coherency
Multi-core CPUs introduce the problem of cache coherency, in which the CPU must handle the
possibility of caches in different cores holding different values for the same address. This will
1Configurable; default is Pseudo-LRU.
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Table 1: Cache replacement policies for specific processors [A7T,A15,A53b,A57,A72].
Processor L1I L1D L2
ARM Cortex-A7 Pseudorandom Pseudorandom Pseudorandom
ARM Cortex-A15 LRU LRU Random
ARM Cortex-A53 Pseudorandom Pseudorandom Undocumented
ARM Cortex-A57 LRU LRU Random
ARM Cortex-A72 LRU LRU Pseudo-LRU or Pseudorandom1
happen, for example, if one core modifies some data that is already present in another core’s
cache. In this case, the respective L1 caches will not agree on the current value for the particular
address. The solution is to either invalidate all copies of the data in all other caches, which lets
the other cores know it is out-of-date, or to just update all copies of the data in the other caches.
Two common approaches to implement cache coherency are to either have each core snoop
all requests and react appropriately, or use a logically-central directory that records shared data
between cores. The snooping scheme elegantly takes advantage of the existing hardware bus
connecting the cores by broadcasting all data requests. The directory scheme, on the other hand,
allows for unicast messages between cores, which ultimately scales better.
2.2.3 Cache Maintenance
It is common for an instruction set architecture (ISA) to provide dedicated instructions that
interact with the computer’s caches. These are used, for example, when the cache controller is
ensuring coherency between cores, or in self-modifying code to ensure correct execution. One such
instruction may mark a targeted cache line as invalid, which is also known as invalidating it. This
is often as simple as flipping a single bit, which indicates it is outdated so that any future cache
“hits” to this address instead go to memory as a cache miss. This has the same effect as flushing
the cache line, which removes its presence completely. There can also be instructions that clean
cache lines, which write a dirty line’s data out to memory if it has changed since being fetched into
the cache. These cache maintenance operations may be combined or kept as distinct instructions,
depending on the architecture. They may apply to only a specified cache, or to the entire cache
hierarchy. Further, these instructions may require special permissions to be executed, depending
on the processor.
Intel’s x86 ISA offers the clflush instruction [int], which cleans and then flushes all cache lines
associated with a specified address from the entire cache hierarchy. This instruction is available
from userspace. It also offers clflushopt as of the 6th generation of Intel Core processors, which is
identical in effect to clflush, but has better performance.
ARM offers dedicated instructions to clean a cache line based on a specific way, set, and cache
level (L1 or L2), or by virtual address. In the latter case, the programmer must also indicate
if coherency should be guaranteed from the perspective of input/output devices (such as a solid
state drive), or if it must be guaranteed coherent only at the L2 cache. These are known as the
Point of Coherency and Point of Unification, respectively. Up until the recent ARMv8, these
instructions were only available in privileged mode. In ARMv8, it is possible to allow a subset
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of these maintenance instructions to be executed from userspace by setting the SCTRL EL1.UCI
bit2. Specifically, the userspace instructions are limited to [ARMb]:
DC CVAU Clean by virtual address to point of unification
DC CVAC Clean by virtual address to point of coherency
DC CIVAC Clean and invalidate by virtual address to point of coherency
IC IVAU Invalidate by virtual address to point of unification
The first three instructions affect data and the last instruction affects instructions, which can
be surmised from the “DC” (data cache) and “IC” (instruction cache) initialisms.
It should be noted that operating systems may provide their own syscalls to allow execution
of cache maintenance operations from userspace. For example, Linux and Android provide the
cacheflush syscall which cleans the given addresses in the L1D and invalidates them in the L1I.
We believe this functionality was introduced for use in self-modifying code (which requires cleaned
data and invalidated instructions to execute correctly). Until the ARMv8 Cortex-A53 processor,
this syscall did not additionally invalidate the L2.
Thus, until ARMv8, there was no usable flush instruction in realistic, userspace attacks.
2.2.4 Cache Inclusiveness
In a system with multiple levels of caches, there is a design choice whether to allow lower level
caches to hold data already present in higher level caches. Lower level caches are inclusive if they
guarantee this property for all information in higher level caches, i.e., the higher level caches are
a formal subset of the lower level caches. Caches are exclusive if they strictly forbid this property,
such that a single address can only exist in one level of cache at a time. If the cache design does
not implement one of these extremes, it is referred to as non-inclusive; information may or may
not exist in multiple levels of cache at the same time. Although inclusiveness creates redundancy,
thereby decreasing the total effective size of the processor’s cache, this effect is small since lower
level caches are generally orders of magnitude larger than higher levels. Further, it simplifies cache
coherency since it reduces the need for higher level caches to communicate with each other; they
are guaranteed to be coherent since the inclusion property of the lowest level cache ensures they
contain the same information.
If higher level caches are not unified, then the lower level cache’s inclusiveness may be specific
to either the instruction or data cache. In this case, we refer to the lower level cache as either
instruction-inclusive or data-inclusive. For brevity, we may refer to the higher level cache which is
“included” in the lower level cache as the inclusive L1 cache, and we may refer to the lower level
cache as either data or instruction inclusive.
2The reset value of this bit is undefined, so some processors may have it enabled by default.
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2.2.5 Programmable Cache Lockdown
Some ARM processors support the ability to lock down parts of the cache such that data in specified
set-ways will not be evicted, sometimes with the exception from cache maintenance operations,
until the lockdown is removed. This feature largely depends on the system-on-chip (SoC), as
the processors that do support it usually leave it implementation defined. The programmer can
activate this feature by writing the appropriate system register with the desired way(s) to lock
down, or indicating that subsequent line(s) allocated to the cache ought to be locked down. This
type of lockdown is used primarily by real-time operating systems where guaranteed performance
of small sections of code is required, such as interrupt handlers.
This programmable cache lockdown is orthogonal to the topic of this paper: the undocumented,
implicit lockdown that prevents cores from evicting another core’s cache line. One obvious differ-
ence is that a cache line that has been programmatically locked down cannot be evicted from any
core, but a cache line that has been implicitly locked down can be evicted by the same core that
locked it by filling the respective L1 cache. This is discussed in much more detail in Section 5.
The ARM Cortex A7, A15, and A57 explicitly document that they do not support the pro-
grammable lockdown, however they all feature the implicit lockdown described in this paper.
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3 Debugging ARM Processors
Debugging is a necessary and often time-consuming part of development. Present since ARMv4,
basic external debugging has been upgraded into a wide variety of features that allow in depth
control and information tracing. ARMv6 and ARMv7-A introduced rich application software
platforms, like self-hosted debugging, which allows hardware and software to debug itself without
the need for an external device, and performance profiling. ARMv7 defines basic debug facilities,
such as breakpoints, watchpoints, and instruction execution in debug mode, at the architectural
level. Finally, ARMv8 increased the level of control the debugger has over core-specific activity,
and adds the ability to non-invasively collect large amounts of program execution data [ARMa].
ARM hardware can feature two different types of debugging capabilities: invasive and non-
invasive. The former involves active interaction with program execution, while the latter is used
to passively collect information.
Invasive debugging involves either an external device that connects to CPU cores via JTAG pins
or a similar interface, or specific software on the same device that can monitor for debug events.
It gives fine-grain control over program execution, for example, stopping program execution, or
stepping through execution line by line, in terms of both C source lines and assembly instructions.
Further, it allows for the inspection and modification of ARM registers and memory. Hardware
breakpoints, which use comparators that trigger on specific addresses, are limited in number but
can be used anywhere in memory without the need to modify code. Software breakpoints, on the
other hand, can be used in large quantities, but only in DRAM, as they temporarily replace the
target instruction with a BRK or HLT instruction. Additional debugging tools give support to
more complicated breakpoints, like stopping on any instruction in a range of addresses, or only
after a specific sequence of events or hardware state.
Invasive debugging is referred to as halting debug when using an external device, monitor
debug if self-hosted, or semihosted, if it is a mix of both. In halting debug, debug events cause
the particular core to enter a debug state, in which it stops fetching instructions from memory
and instead executes under the direction of a debugger hosted elsewhere. The external debugger
operates concurrently and possibly independently of the processor being debugged. In monitor
debug, debug events cause a debug exception to be raised, which the monitor software must handle.
Semihosting debug enables code on the target to use facilities of the debug host, for example, the
keyboard input, screen output, and disk I/O. Like self-hosted debug, it is implemented through
software instructions that generate exceptions. These are handled by the debug agent, which
communicates with the host machine.
Non-invasive debugging does not actively interact with execution, but instead only observes the
behavior of the core during execution. The main type of non-invasive debugging in ARM processors
is known as trace. It can record memory accesses (both address and data), peripheral accesses,
stack and heap accesses, and changes to variables. This data can be used to profile execution to
find performance bottlenecks and provide call graph exploration, among other possibilities. Trace
is provided by the embedded trace macrocell (ETM), as an internal hardware block connected to
the core.
ARM CoreSight is an integrated technology for invasive and non-invasive debugging on ARM-
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based SoCs. It expands the capabilities of the ETM to give more control to the debugger. For
example, with CoreSight, one can control multiple cores synchronously, so when one hits a break-
point, they all stop. CoreSight components include, but aren’t limited to:
Debug Access Port (DAP): Enables the external debugger to access system memory without
putting the core into a debug state.
Embedded Cross Trigger (ECT): Links the debug capabilities of multiple devices, e.g., cores.
3.1 Performance Monitoring Unit
In additional to non-invasive debugging, there is available a performance monitoring unit (PMU)
in modern ARM processors that can be used to gather statistics on processor operations and the
memory system and analyze their performance. The PMU offers a small number of hardware
counters (e.g., four in the Cortex-A7 and six in the A53) that can be programmed via registers to
track the number of occurrences of certain events. Example events are the number of clock cycles
that have elapsed, the number of DRAM accesses, the number of L1 misses, whether an exception
has been taken, et cetera. A comprehensive list of events can be found in the technical reference
manual for the given processor. The PMU registers are generally only accessible with elevated
permissions, but there are system control registers that allow userspace access.
3.2 DS-5 and DSTREAM
ARM provides DS-5 Development Studio, an Eclipse-based feature-rich suite of development tools
for ARM processors. The ultimate edition includes the LLVM-based ARM Compiler 6 and ARMv8
Fixed Virtual Platforms that give the ability to compile and debug code without needing target
hardware. The debugging abilities of DS-5 ultimate edition include loading application images and
debug symbols, running images, fundamental debugging features such as step-by-step execution
and breakpoints, as well as application rewind, which lets the user debug the execution backwards.
DS-5 ultimate edition can be used to debug bare-metal applications and Linux kernel and kernel
modules using JTAG, and also to debug Linux applications using gdbserver. It features debug
capabilities for bare-metal SMP systems, including cross-triggering and core-dependent views and
breakpoints. Through ARM CoreSight, DS-5 also supports non-inclusive program trace. Among
the many debugging tools provided by DS-5 is the Cache View window, which lets the user look
into the L1, L2, and TLB caches of the processor cores. ARM also produces DSTREAM3, a debug
probe intended to accelerate development and device bring-up. It includes JTAG, CoreSight, TI,
and MIPI adapters. Many features of DS-5 are only available if a DSTREAM unit is connected to
the target hardware, as that is how it can exert control over the target.
A screenshot of DS-5 (and DSTREAM, though not shown) being used to debug a dual-core
Cortex-A57 CPU is given in Figure 4. As pictured, DS-5 is partitioned into five windows, with
two on the left and three on the right4. These will now be described in turn, moving left-to-right,
3https://www.arm.com/products/tools/arm-dstream-high-performance-debug-trace.php
4Note that there is much more to DS-5 than pictured in the screenshot. It has dozens of more windows that
each provide functionality.
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top-to-bottom:
• The top left window, “Debug Control”, allows the user to connect to the target hardware
(physical or virtual), and control program execution on a per-cluster or per-core basis. The
screenshot shows DS-5 is currently connected to two Cortex-A57 cores, and that program
execution in both cores is currently stopped because a software breakpoint was triggered in
core 0.
• The top right window is currently focused on “Cache View”, which gives the user visual
access into the caches. The screenshot indicates that the L2 tags of core 0 are currently in
view, and lists the metadata for several cache lines in sets 2 and 3. Note that the three cache
ways visible in set 2 are all invalid, and are thus logically not in the cache, so their addresses
are not displayed.
• The bottom left window is for editing source code. It can be seen that the debugger is
currently stopped on a breakpoint on line 249 in file primes.c
• In the bottom right corner, there is the “Disassembly” window, which upon user request will
show disassembled source code. However, it is not currently being used in the screenshot.
Below that is the “App Console” window, which is used for I/O for the application being
debugged.
3.3 Debugging on bare-metal
Instead of running an operating system, applications can be run on bare-metal, which gives the
programmer full control over the embedded device’s hardware. This can be accomplished by
programming the bootloader to load the programmer’s application image instead of the default
OS image. The application must initialize the device’s components that would normally be handled
in the OS, such as the MMU, the CPU caches, and secondary cores. A large benefit of running
bare-metal is the elimination of background activity from the OS during computation. This is
especially useful when debugging caches, as normal OS scheduling will inexorably pollute cache
sets.
With DS-5 and DSTREAM, running bare-metal is a matter of creating a corresponding bare-
metal debug configuration and loading the desired bare-metal application. This is accomplished
by selecting the appropriate SoC, debug scenario, and application, via the debug configuration
editor in DS-5. There is no significant difference in setup or methodology between debugging
Linux (kernel, kernel module, or applications) and debugging bare-metal, besides the additional
source code needed to initialize the hardware. Example code that handles device startup, hard-
ware initialization, and running a user application is provided with DS-5 for single and multicore
environments. A snippet of this code is given in Figure 5 for illustration. This code is responsible
for powering on secondary cores; at this point in execution, the primary core has already started
hardware initialization. Since most hardware initialization should only be done once, with the
exception of core-specific resources like MMU configuration, secondary cores are put into a waiting
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pen. This is done on lines 628 to 635, where the cores will spend most of their time sleeping on line
630. Once the primary core has finished initialization, it will send a software generated interrupt
(SGI) to the secondary cores which will signal them to leave the waiting pen (line 635), initialize
their own MMUs (lines 645 to 651), and branch to the main application code (line 654).
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Figure 5: Code snippet provided by ARM to initialize secondary cores in a bare-metal debug setup.
The primary core will initialize the non-core-private hardware resources while the secondary cores
sleep.
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4 Cache-timing Attacks
In cybersecurity, a side-channel attack is one that leverages weaknesses in the physical manifesta-
tion of a system, rather than exploiting its theoretical basis. These side-channels can take the form
of, but aren’t limited to, thermal energy, acoustic information, and EM radiation emission from
a CPU, or hardware-related timing differences, during the execution of specific algorithms. The
most well known type of side-channel attacks in this last category are known as cache-timing side-
channels attacks, or cache attacks for short. These can glean sensitive information by measuring
the execution time of selected instructions to determine if particular data is in the CPU’s cache. A
common example involves discerning if instructions that depend on bits of a cryptographic secret
key are executed, which indirectly reveals those bits of the key [YF14, I˙GI+16].
4.1 History
Although cache attacks gained most of their popularity within the last five years, they are not
a new phenomenon. In fact, as early as 1992, Hu already theoretically studied the effect of
microarchitectural side channel attacks [Hu]. His work was later expanded by Page [Pag02] to
introduce cache hits and misses as a covert channel to steal unauthorized information. This leakage
was first observed by Tsunoo et al. [TSSS03], who utilized it to attack the DES block cipher. It was
in 2004 when the first practical attacks against AES were introduced by both Bernstein [Ber04]
and Osvik et al. [OST06]. While the first one based his analysis in collisions occurring during
an AES encryption, the latter implemented two spy process techniques named Evict+Time and
Prime+Probe.
In the following years, several variants of the applicability of the aforementioned techniques
were presented. For instance, in 2007, Aciimez utilized the Prime+Probe technique to steal an
RSA secret key from the instruction cache [Acı] while Neve and Seifert utilized it to perform a
last round AES attack [NS07]. Shortly after, Ristenpart et al. [RTSS] used the same technique
to recover keystrokes from co-resident VMs, a work that would later be expanded by Zhang et
al. [ZJRRb], proving the effectiveness of Prime+Probe to recover El Gamal cryptographic keys
across VMs. Zhang et al. [ZJOR] further implemented a Prime+Probe based co-residency checker
in IaaS clouds.
Although dangerous, all of the techniques described above were only shown to be successful
in exploiting core private resources. Indeed, cache attacks did not start to show their entire
potential until 2013, when Yarom and Falkner [YF14] (utilizing a similar technique as in [GBK],
who recovered AES keys from a core co-resident user) presented the Flush+Reload attack. This
work, for the first time, demonstrated the viability of recovering RSA keys across cores and across
VMs. Later, this analysis was expanded by Irazoqui et al. demonstrating the ability to recover AES
keys and TLS session messages [IIES14, IIES15]. Further, Benger et al. [BvdPSY14] showed the
feasibility of recovering ECC secret keys, Zhang et al. [ZJRRa] attacked e-commerce applications
across PaaS VMs and Gruss et al. [GSM15] implemented template attacks with the Flush+Reload
technique.
Despite its applicability, the Flush+Reload attack still suffers from its shared memory require-
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ment. This requirement was bypassed by Liu et al. [Fan] and Irazoqui et al. [IES] by showing
the feasibility of the Prime+Probe technique in the LLC, shared across cores. Later, Oren et
al. [OKSK15] demonstrated that cache attacks are also applicable as javascript extensions, and
Inci et al. [I˙GI+16] demonstrated the applicability of the technique in commercial IaaS clouds. Re-
cently, Lipp et al. [LGS+16] showed that both the Flush+Reload technique and the Prime+Probe
technique, as well as the related Evict+Reload and Flush+Flush techniques, are applicable in
mobile devices, including smartphone applications.
Recently, similar techniques have been shown to target very different aspects of the cache hier-
archy to recover information. For instance, Irazoqui et al. [IES16] demonstrated the applicability
of cache attacks across CPUs, Yarom et al. [YGH16] showed that cache bank contentions can also
leak information, and Zhang et al. [ZXZ16] proved that the Flush+Reload technique can be used
instruction-side to mount ROP attacks in mobile devices. Further, Pessl et al. [PGM+16] utilized
cache priming techniques to implement DRAM access, and Gruss et al. utilized these techniques
to implement cache prefetching attacks [GMF+16].
It is clear from these related works that there is an overwhelming majority of research dedicated
to attacking Intel’s x86 architecture. Two of the few exceptions are the recent ARMageddon and
ROP-based Flush+Reload papers [LGS+16,ZXZ16], which make several contributions to overcome
the challenges of applying known x86 cache attacks on ARM. We discuss their methodology with
respect to implicit cache lockdown in Section 5.
4.2 Practical Considerations
This section discusses practical techniques common among cache-timing attacks. These can differ
between microarchitectures, but our discussions will primarily focus on ARM.
4.2.1 Cache Line Eviction
Some of these attacks require evicting information from the cache. This can be done by leveraging
the limited set-associativity of the underlying hardware. For example, to evict a cache line from a
4-way set-associative L1D, the attacker must force the L1D to fetch at least 4 distinct set-congruent
lines, which would optimally fill all 4 ways of that particular set, forcing the target cache line to
be evicted. However, the replacement policy of the cache affects the ability to do this. In LRU
policies, this optimal situation will occur, since by the fourth consecutive fetch, the target cache
line is guaranteed to be the least recently used cache line. In pseudorandom replacement policies,
there is no guarantee that the target cache line will ever be selected to be evicted. Despite this,
researchers have shown that an optimal eviction strategy can be found for any processor through
trial and error [GSM15, LGS+16]. Intel processors generally use a LRU replacement policy in
their caches, but ARM processors can have differing replacement policies between processors and
even between cache levels within the same processor, as previously shown in Table 1. While
surmountable, this increases the complexity of attacking ARM devices.
An example eviction strategy for the Cortex-A53 is given in Algorithm 1 to show the structure
of the “sliding window” techniques from [LGS+16]. The number of iterations within each for loop
may vary between each processor, but the structure of the algorithm need not. By experimentally
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varying the number of these iterations, one can find the minimum number of memory accesses
needed for guaranteed eviction for a given processor.
Algorithm 1: An example eviction strategy for the Cortex-A53.
Input: addrs, a list of set-congruent addresses
1 for i = 0..24 do /* start of sliding window */
2 for j = 0..1 do /* number of repetitions per window */
3 for k = 0..5 do /* number of addresses per window */
4 access addrs[i + k];
5 end
6 end
7 end
Since caches operate on physical addresses, finding set-congruent addresses when running
bare-metal is a simple matter of algebra, since there aren’t obfuscating virtual addresses. On
Linux, physical addresses can be found by consulting /proc/[pid]/pagemap for a particular pro-
cess, which lists mappings between virtual and physical addresses. For any given physical address,
set-congruent addresses can be found with knowledge of the cache structure. Specifically, incre-
menting the tag of a physical address will result in the first sequential address that is set-congruent.
This is because doing so keeps all lower bits, namely those that comprise the set number, the same,
and therefore the address will map to the same set.
The manner in which a set-congruent address is accessed differs depending on whether it is
data or an instruction. Data addresses can be accessed by loading their content to a register
with the LDR assembly instruction. Instruction addresses can be accessed by executing a branch
instruction that jumps to it. Multiple set-congruent instructions can be accessed in a row, as per
Algorithm 1, by first enumerating several thousand function calls to a dummy function, a small
subset of which will be on set-congruent memory lines. This dummy function will keep track
of the sliding window and branch to a subsequent set-congruent function call. In this manner,
by ensuring the dummy function is not composed of set-congruent instruction addresses, cache
pollution is prevented.
For reference in this and later sections, we use the term self-eviction to describe when a proces-
sor’s core evicts a cache line from its own L1 cache, regardless of intention. This is to distinguish
from an attacking core evicting a cache line from a victim core’s L1 cache. In either case, the
group of set-congruent addresses used to evict the targeted cache line is referred to as an eviction
set.
4.2.2 Timing Memory Accesses
One fundamental aspect of cache-timing attacks is the ability to accurately time memory accesses.
The PMU has an event that corresponds to the number of elapsed clock cycles. Since clock speeds
are generally consistent throughout execution, it can be used to compare relative execution times
between sets of instructions. While the PMU is not directly accessible by userspace applications
by default, there has been an unprivleged syscall available in Linux 2.6.31 that acts as a wrapper
to the cycle counter. [LGS+16] thoroughly discusses this and two other methods of measuring
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time that are available from userspace: a POSIX timing function and a dedicated thread counter.
This latter option simply spawns a thread to solely increment a variable in an infinite loop. Since
this read-increment-write sequence generally takes a consistent number of cycles to execute, this
provides a high enough resolution to distinguish cache hits from misses.
4.2.3 Shared Memory
Shared memory refers to when multiple processes each have data in their own virtual address
spaces, possibly with distinct virtual addresses from each other, that all map to the same physical
addresses. This can be used to easily share data across processes, and can also be used to remove
seemingly needless redundancy in main memory. However, by removing the memory isolation
given to processes by virtual addressing, shared memory can be used by attackers to influence a
victim process’ memory address space. Indeed, Flush+Reload leverages this principle.
Memory deduplication is one instance of shared memory. In this case, the kernel will period-
ically scan physical memory for duplicate frames. Upon finding one, if the kernel determines the
frames will not be updated frequently, it will merge them into one frame and update the corre-
sponding virtual address spaces. The kernel will mark this shared memory as copy-on-write so
that if one process modifies the data, it will be copied to another location as to not affect other
processes. An example of deduplication mechanisms is Kernel Same-page Merging (KSM), imple-
mented in every Linux operating system (and consequently in the KVM hypervisor) by default.
Another example is VMware’s Transparent Page Sharing (TPS), which was a default feature until
2014. A second instance of shared memory is brought about through the usage of shared libraries,
which refer to precompiled code that can be used by multiple applications. Shared libraries are
extensively used in all major operating systems.
4.3 Known Cache Attacks
In this section, we describe known cache-timing attacks and the differences in their implementations
between Intel and ARM processors. We also mention the farthest architectural-distance achieved
when performing each of these attacks; the more architecturally distant the attacker and victim
are, the more realistic and severe the attack.
The overarching goal of these attacks is to determine the data that a given victim process
operate on. This data is often intended to be sensitive, such as cryptographic keys. This can
be done, for example, by trying to glean that specific data directly, or by analyzing the code the
victim process will execute, and inferring the data based on discerning the exact execution path.
The following cache attacks work in the general case; it is up to the attacker to apply them on a
case-by-case basis.
4.3.1 Evict+Time
Evict+Time, summarized in Algorithm 2, uses timing measurements to determine which cache sets
are occupied by the victim’s algorithm, whatever it may be. The idea is to time the algorithm’s
execution before and after selectively evicting hypothesized addresses from the cache. By compar-
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ing the execution times, the attacker gains insight into whether the selected addresses are used by
the algorithm. Specifically, if the addresses were indeed used, the executions will take a similar
amount of time. Otherwise, the second execution is likely to be faster because it has more data in
the cache. Note that the attacker needs to run the eviction algorithm once before measuring its
execution time so that the latter two executions both run with a similar amount of cached data
(excluding the data being tested). The very first execution of the algorithm will always take a
longer amount of time because it does not have any cached data; all of its memory accesses will
come from DRAM (assuming an initial clean cache). The second and third executions, the ones
being timed, will be able to use some data that is already in the cache.
However, it is possible that the results of Evict+Time can be misleading. For example, if
the algorithm self-evicts its own data during execution, then both executions may take a similar
amount of time regardless of the attacker’s eviction. Furthermore, the algorithm may not have
consistent execution time to begin with, possibly due to its size, its nature, or the method by which
it is invoked (e.g., by a noisy kernel system call).
Evict+Time has only been shown to work in Intel processors [OST06], but we are confident it
would work just as well in ARM processors. It has also yet to be applied in the LLC for cross-
core attacks. If an attacker desires to apply Evict+Time across cores, she can only apply it in
an inclusive LLC since she needs to evict the victim’s upper level caches. We believe the lack of
attention given to Evict+Time is due to the better practicality of the Prime+Probe attack.
Algorithm 2: Evict+Time
1 Run victim’s algorithm once to load its data and instructions into the cache.
2 Run victim’s algorithm a second time, measuring its execution time.
3 Evict from the cache address(es) possibly used by the algorithm.
4 Run victim’s algorithm a third time, measuring its execution time again.
5 if Execution times similar then Conclude targeted address(es) likely used by algorithm;
4.3.2 Prime+Probe
Prime+Probe, like Evict+Time, is an attack that can identify cache sets used by the victim’s
algorithm. As described in Algorithm 3, it does so by determining which cache-primed memory
lines have slow access times after running the victim’s algorithm. Slow access times indicate that
the address is being fetched from DRAM, which implies it must have been evicted from cache. The
idea is to execute steps 1-3 with as little delay as possible, so that the only reason cache evictions
could occur would be from the victim’s algorithm. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
Algorithm 3: Prime+Probe
1 Prime cache set by accessing set-congruent addresses
2 Execute victim’s algorithm.
3 Time how long it takes to re-access (probe) each address.
4 if Access times are slow then Conclude targeted set is used by algorithm;
As with Evict+Time, Prime+Probe only works under the assumption of inclusive caches. Oth-
erwise, the attacker would not be able to evict the set occupied by the targeted memory block
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(a) Step 1, the attacker fills a target (4-way)
cache set with her data.
(b) Step 2, the attacker lets the victim pro-
cess access its data.
(c) Step 3, the attacker measures access
times to her data.
Figure 6: High-level overview of the Prime+Probe attack corresponding to Algorithm 3. If the
access times in step 3 are relatively slow, that indicates they were evicted from the cache by the
victim process.
in the victim’s L1 cache in Step 1. However, unlike Evict+Time, Prime+Probe does not time
the execution of the algorithm under attack. Instead, it times the relatively noise-free execution
of its own memory accesses, providing an access pattern over time, thereby increasing resolution,
reliability, and providing wider applicability.
Prime+Probe has been shown to work cross-core in Intel [IES] and ARM [LGS+16]. The
only implementation differences are related to processor-dependent parameters, such as the cache
associativity.
4.3.3 Flush+Reload
The Flush+Reload attack, outlined in Algorithm 4 and illustrated in Figure 7, also provides
information on the memory addresses used by the victim, and consequently the data on which it
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operates. However Flush+Reload implements a slightly different approach than Evict+Time and
Prime+Probe, as it operates on shared data between victim and attacker. Like Prime+Probe, the
attacker only measures accesses made by her own attacking algorithm. By using shared memory
and the architecture’s flush instruction, Flush+Reload guarantees a quick removal of the targeted
memory address. This improvement allows for a greater resolution and lower noise because there
is a larger percentage of time that can be devoted to waiting for the victim.
Although the shared memory requirement might seem unrealistic, it can be easily satisfied by
an attacker with shared libraries or memory deduplication. This is discussed in Section 4.2.3.
The Flush+Reload attack does not require the inclusiveness property to succeed. Due to shared
memory, the flush stage invalidates the data throughout the entire cache hierarchy, including
the victim’s private L1 caches. As the cache coherency protocol has to ensure coherency even
across CPU sockets, the attack also works across CPUs in Intel and ARMv8, as pointed out
in [IES16,LGS+16]. The reload stage will be fast if the targeted memory line is in the cache. Since
it was flushed from the cache just prior, it will only be in the cache if the victim has accessed it.
In Intel, the cache flush instruction is clflush, and indeed, it invalidates the given address from
the entire cache hierarchy. In ARM, the situation is slightly more complicated. Linux or Android,
when running on ARMv7 (and potentially prior), offer an ARM specific syscall, cacheflush, to
clean the L1D and invalidate the L1I of the specified address. Note that only the instruction side
is invalidated; the data side is not. However, in ARMv7 processors, this operation does not affect
the entire hierarchy. Namely, L2 cache lines are not invalidated even if they were invalidated in
the L1I [ZXZ16]. Thus, lacking any userspace flush instruction, Flush+Reload is not realistically
possible on ARMv7. This is not the case with ARMv8: the cacheflush syscall does flush the
L2 on the ARM Cortex-A53 [ZXZ16], thereby permitting instruction-side Flush+Reload attacks.
Further, it is possible to to enable userspace data invalidation hardware instructions in ARMv8,
as described in 2.2.3. When enabled, this allows data-side Flush+Reload attacks to be conducted,
as demonstrated in [LGS+16].
Algorithm 4: Flush+Reload
1 Flush specific memory line(s) from entire cache hierarchy.
2 Allow victim time to access memory line(s).
3 Time the reload of the memory line(s).
4 if Reload is fast then Conclude memory line is used by algorithm;
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(a) The initial state before the Flush+Reload
attack. The attacker shares a memory ad-
dress with the victim, which may already be
in the cache.
(b) Step 1, the attacker flushes the memory
line from the cache.
(c) Step 2, the attacker lets the victim exe-
cute, possibly accessing the shared memory.
(d) Step 3, the attacker reloads the memory.
If the reload comes from the cache (pictured),
it will be relatively quick.
Figure 7: High-level overview of the Flush+Reload attack corresponding to Algorithm 4. If the
reload step is relatively slow, the target cache line must have been loaded from main memory,
indicating the victim process did not access it.
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4.3.4 Evict+Reload
Evict+Reload, described in Algorithm 5, combines characteristics of the Prime+Probe and
Flush+Reload attacks. Instead of using the full-hierarchical flush instruction, removal of the
targeted memory from the cache hierarchy is performed with an eviction set, like in Prime+Probe.
This is useful when there is no userspace flush instruction, such as in ARMv7 and earlier, and in
ARMv8 when flush is unavailable from userspace. For eviction to affect the relevant elements of
the cache hierarchy, the processor being attacked must be inclusive with respect to the type of
information the attacker is utilizing, data or instruction, like in Prime+Probe. Evict+Reload has
yet to be shown to work across CPUs. Since the flush instruction is what cross-CPU Flush+Reload
relies on—flush invalidates shared data regardless of location in the cache hierarchy—we are not
sure if Evict+Reload can be applied cross-CPU. This attack has been carried out on both Intel
and ARM processors [GSM15, LGS+16], without significant difference between implementations
except processor-dependent parameters (e.g., cache associativity).
Algorithm 5: Evict+Reload
1 Evict specific memory line(s) from entire cache hierarchy.
2 Allow victim time to access memory line(s).
3 Time the reload of the memory line(s).
4 if Reload is fast then Conclude memory line is used by algorithm;
4.3.5 Flush+Flush
Flush+Flush leverages the observation that the architecture’s flush instruction can abort early if it
detects a cache miss. Thus, timing measurements of the flush instruction can be used to determine
if a targeted memory addresses is present in the cache or not. Unlike the other cache attacks,
Flush+Flush does not access memory itself, but instead simply repeatedly times the execution of
the flush instruction, as described in Algorithm 6.
This attack has been shown to work in both Intel and ARMv8 processors [GMWM16,LGS+16],
with the only difference between them being the architecture-dependent flush instruction.
As in the case of Flush+Reload, the Flush+Flush attack does not require cache inclusion to
succeed, and works even when victim and attacker reside in different CPUs.
Algorithm 6: Flush+Flush
1 while True do
2 Time the flush of specific memory line(s) from entire cache hierarchy.
3 if Flush is fast then Conclude memory line has not been used by algorithm;
4 end
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5 Implicit Cache Lockdown
We have observed behavior in several ARM Cortex-A processors that restricts the ability of one
CPU core to evict information residing in another core’s L1 cache. We call this behavior im-
plicit cache lockdown, to differentiate it from the programmable cache lockdown discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.5.
Specifically, we observe that a cache line in a core’s inclusive L1 cache, and thus also in the L2
cache, will remain in these caches until evicted by the same core that allocated it. This effectively
“locks down” the particular way of the corresponding cache set from the perspective of other cores,
as they are not able to evict it or allocate new data to it. We have observed this behavior holds
true for as many ways as the inclusive L1 cache has per core, and can happen simultaneously in
multiple cores. This eviction restriction even extends to the other L1 cache (recall there is a data
L1 cache and an instruction L1 cache per core) in the same core that is locking down ways: the
core’s non-inclusive memory cannot evict information from the inclusive L1 cache. Thus, a large
portion of the L2 cache may be effectively unusable by a particular core if the other cores in the
CPU have allocated lines in their own inclusive L1 caches. Referring to Table 2, one can see that
in the Quad-core Cortex-A7, there are four 2-way L1I caches, which means it is possible for the
entire 8-way L2 cache to be locked down by the instruction caches. In this case, data would not
be able to be allocated to the L2 until one of the cores self-evicts (i.e., evicts a line itself due to
normal cache activity), or until a privileged cache maintenance operation invalidates a cache line.
This effect is also present in the other processors, but to a lesser degree. In the A15 and A57, 4
ways, or 25% of the L2, can be locked down at once. In the A53, up to 8 ways, or 50% of the L2,
can be locked down at once.
Table 2: Set-associativity of ARM and ARM-based processors
Processor Num. cores in SoC Inclusive L1 Ways L2 ways
Cortex-A7 4 2 (Instruction) 8
Cortex-A15 2 2 (Data) 16
Cortex-A53 4 2 (Instruction) 16
Cortex-A57 2 2 (Data) 16
Krait 4505 4 4 (Data) 8
Note that this behavior holds even in the absence of subsequent activity in the other cores;
their initial allocation to their inclusive L1 is all that is needed to lock down the way in the L2,
forever6.
Our experiments demonstrate this behavior only exists in the inclusive L1 caches of each pro-
cessor. All of the tested processors have separate instruction and data L1 caches, and all but the
A7 and A53 are data-inclusive.
We have only found the lockdown behavior to exist in ARM processors. In our experiments
with the Qualcomm Snapdragon Krait architecture, which uses the ARM instruction set but has
5No official public documentation for this architecture exists, but the table lists what we found through experi-
mentation and online articles [kra].
6I.e., until they evict the line themselves, or a relevant privileged cache maintenance instruction is executed, such
as DC CIVAC.
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its own processor design, albeit ARM-based, we did not find lockdown to exist. Table 3 summarizes
our findings.
Table 3: Implicit lockdown presence in ARM and ARM-based processors
Processor System On Chip Inclusiveness Inclusive L1 Non-inclusive L1
Cortex-A7 Samsung Exynos 5422 Instruction Implicit Lockdown Present Not Present
Cortex-A15 Samsung Exynos 5250 Data Implicit Lockdown Present Not Present
Cortex-A53 ARM Juno r0 Instruction Implicit Lockdown Present Not Present
Cortex-A57 ARM Juno r0 Data Implicit Lockdown Present Not Present
Krait 450 Qualcomm Snapdragon 805 Data Not Present Not Present
The exception we have found to this implicit lockdown is from privileged cache maintenance
operations. Any core that runs, e.g., DC CIVAC, on the L2 cache will successfully clean and
invalidate the targeted cache line(s) regardless of whether it is in another core’s inclusive L1 cache,
assuming the appropriate control register bits are set.
5.1 Methodology and Results
Our original attempts at mounting cross-core cache-timing attacks on ARM were problematic due
to inconsistent results. We observed that although they would occasionally succeed, more often
than not they would fail because of fast memory accesses from the victim core. These observations
are what initially led us to investigate implicit cache lockdown. To determine the underlying
behavior, we devised three different types of experiments. The first and most reliable utilized the
DSTREAM debugging unit. This allowed us to set breakpoints before and after flush instructions
and eviction algorithms, and let us peek into the contents of the L1 and L2 caches to see if the
targeted cache lines were there or not. One of the DSTREAM-supported processors we used has a
hardware limitation inhibiting L2 debug access, so we ran a second set of experiments on it utilizing
the Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU). This let us observe the number of cache and memory
accesses before and after flush instructions and eviction strategies, from which we can determine
if the targeted cache line was evicted or not. As further evidence of implicit cache lockdown, and
since one of our SoCs was not supported by DSTREAM, we ran a third set of experiments on all
processors that simply utilized standard cache-timing measurements. Like the other experiments,
this let us infer from where in the memory hierarchy targeted addresses were being fetched. All of
these experiments were collectively used to ascertain the results tabulated in Table 3.
Every experiment we ran required us to evict particular contents from the cache hierarchy.
For this, we use the “sliding window” eviction strategies discussed in Section 4.2.1. In short,
by accessing set-congruent addresses in a specific pattern, targeted cache lines are guaranteed to
be evicted from the cache (when lockdown is not present). Complicated eviction patterns are
necessary to defeat the non-deterministic replacement policies of the caches. In our experiments
below, we do not necessarily use the optimal (i.e., fewest memory accesses) eviction algorithm for
each processor during the eviction steps. This is to ensure, without a doubt, that our results are
not false positives in the case that the supposed “optimal” eviction algorithm doesn’t quite evict
100% of the time.
To ensure equivalent starting states across experiments, we invalidate the entire cache hierarchy
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as an initial step. We did this by utilizing cache maintenance operations, demonstrated in the
following functions. Note that the instruction invalidation is on a per-core basis, but the data
invalidation affects the entire memory hierarchy.
// clean entire L1I for a given core
void clean_l1I()
{
__asm("IC IALLU");
}
// removes data addr from all core’s l1Ds and shared l2
void clean_dc(void* addr)
{
__asm("DC CIVAC, %0" :: "r" (addr));
}
All of the experiments on the Cortex processors were initially done on bare-metal. The lack of
an operating system eliminates interfering cache usage from system processes, significantly reducing
noise. We used the bare-metal initialization code provided with DS-5 to configure the vector tables,
MMU, caches, secondary cores, et cetera. We modified this startup code to allocate larger stacks
and heaps for each core to fit the data required by our eviction algorithms. These experiments
were then repeated on Linux for verification. The experiments done on the Krait 450, which was
not supported by DSTREAM, only used Linux.
5.1.1 DSTREAM experiments
The most reliable method we used in discovering implicit cache lockdown was through the usage
of ARM DS-5 development studio and the DSTREAM debugging unit. Connected through JTAG,
this device allows us to physically see into the L1 and L2 caches of supported ARM processors
at any point in a core’s execution path. This simplified our experimental process, as we did not
need to, for example, conduct preliminary trials to discern appropriate cache timing thresholds.
However, this method is limited to the SoCs that are supported by DSTREAM7. Out of the five
processors we used, all but the Krait 450 were supported. We were able to see into the L1 caches
of these four, but a hardware limitation of the Cortex-A53 prevented us from seeing into its L2
cache; we could see into the L2 caches of the other three.
Each processor we tested has separate data and instruction L1 caches, with only one of them
being inclusive for a particular processor. When testing for lockdown in a processor’s inclusive L1
cache, we used Algorithm 7. When testing its non-inclusive cache, we used Algorithm 8. These
algorithms differ only in how they allocate the same address line to both the L1 and L2 cache.
While it may not be strictly necessary to ensure the same address line is in both L1 and L2 before
we run the eviction in the non-inclusive case, we did so for the sake of thoroughness.
7https://developer.arm.com/products/software-development-tools/ds-5-development-
studio/resources/supported-devices
33
Algorithm 7: Implicit Lockdown Test in Inclusive Caches
Input:
N , number of ways in L1 sets for given CPU
M , number of addresses in eviction algorithm
P , number of cores being tested
1 Identify M +N ∗ (P − 1) unique set-congruent addresses to comprise eviction algorithm and
locked ways.
2 Invalidate all caches.
3 Cores 1..P − 1 each access N of those addresses, which allocates them to respective L1 and
shared L2.
4 Core P runs eviction algorithma.
5 if Core 1..P − 1’s addresses are still in L2 cache then Lockdown is present;
6 else Lockdown is not present;
aWhile the optimal eviction algorithm can vary between processors, we found that an inefficient strategy like
38-2-6 (corresponding to the number of iterations of each for loop) will work for all processors and removes all
doubt of possible false positives.
For each processor, we verified that the eviction algorithm can successfully evict cache lines
that were fetched by the same core that is running the algorithm. More precisely, we verified
successful eviction when evicting data lines using data addresses, and when evicting instruction
lines using instruction addresses8. We use the term same-type to refer to this subtlety. This
same-type, same-core eviction serves as the control group. We test for lockdown in the same-core,
cross-type case, and in the cross-core cases, by observing if the targeted cache line is still in the
cache after we run the eviction algorithm. Specifically, we use breakpoints to temporarily halt
program execution before and after the eviction algorithm is run. When halted, we use the Cache
View of DS-5 to visually determine if the targeted cache line is present in the respective caches.
Since the only differences between the control and experimental groups are the core that runs the
eviction algorithm and the type of content being used, the results serve as evidence of implicit
cache lockdown as we define it.
Since the A53 does not support L2 debug access, we instead leveraged its L1 inclusiveness9 to
surmise its L2 contents. This approach is nearly identical to the previous Algorithms 7 and 8, the
only difference being checking the L1 cache after eviction instead of the L2.
We ran these experiments 100 times on the Cortex-A7, A15, A53, and A57 processors. All
trials indicate the inclusive cache has implicit cache lockdown, and the non-inclusive cache does
not. Our results are summarized in Table 3.
8We were not able to evict “cross-type” addresses, which is initially what clued us into the implicit lockdown
behavior.
9While we did not find explicit mention in the documentation that the A53 is instruction-inclusive, we believe it is
so. Every recent ARM Cortex processor has had one inclusive and one non-inclusive L1 cache, and the documentation
indicates it is not data-inclusive. Further, the lead architect of the A53 confirmed it in an interview [A53a].
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Algorithm 8: Implicit Lockdown Test in Non-inclusive Caches
Input:
N , number of ways in L1 sets for given CPU
M , number of addresses in eviction algorithm
P , number of cores being tested
1 Identify M + 2N ∗ (P − 1) unique set-congruent addresses to comprise eviction algorithm
and locked ways.
2 Invalidate all caches.
3 Cores 1..P − 1 each access N of those addresses, which allocates them to respective L1.
4 Cores 1..P − 1 each access the 2nd N of those addresses, which pushes the 1st N into L2a.
5 Cores 1..P − 1 each access the 1st N addresses again, which brings them into L1. They also
remain in the L2b.
6 Core P runs eviction algorithm.
7 if Core 1..P − 1’s addresses are still in L2 cache then Lockdown is present;
8 else Lockdown is not present;
aFor L1 caches with a LRU replacement policy, this is true. Otherwise, only some of the 1st N addresses may be
pushed to the L2. However, only a single address is needed to confirm the presence of lockdown.
bFor non-LRU L1 caches, care must be taken to ensure the same line is present in the L1 and L2, which may not
always be the case. Multiple iterations of this algorithm may need to be conducted.
5.1.2 PMU experiments
To verify the lockdown behavior on the A53, we conducted a separate experiment that used the
Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) to count the L1I, L1D, L2, and DRAM accesses with and
without running our eviction algorithm. We programmed four PMU counters to monitor event
numbers 0x04 (L1D_CACHE), 0x14 (L1I_CACHE), 0x16 (L2D_CACHE), and 0x13 (MEM_ACCESS). While
this could have been done in source code, we programmed them by writing to the appropriate
registers via DS-5. We automated this with the following DS-5 script:
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCCFILTR_EL0.NSH = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCCFILTR_EL0.NSU = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCCFILTR_EL0.NSK = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCR_EL0.P = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCR_EL0.C = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCR_EL0.E = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCNTENSET_EL0.C = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMSELR_EL0.SEL = 0
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMXEVTYPER_EL0 = 0x13
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCNTENSET_EL0.P0 = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMSELR_EL0.SEL = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMXEVTYPER_EL0 = 0x16
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCNTENSET_EL0.P1 = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMSELR_EL0.SEL = 2
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set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMXEVTYPER_EL0 = 0x4
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCNTENSET_EL0.P2 = 1
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMSELR_EL0.SEL = 3
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMXEVTYPER_EL0 = 0x14
set var $AARCH64::$System::$PMU::$PMCNTENSET_EL0.P3 = 1
We observed that there were no additional DRAM accesses when reloading the targeted cache
line after executing the eviction algorithm compared to when we did not run the eviction algorithm.
Our exact methodology is described in Algorithm 9. For simplicity, this experiment was conducted
with only two cores, one spy and one victim, running. We ran the experiment five times and
observed consistent results in each trial.
This experiment confirmed the results we had for the A53, found in Table 3.
Algorithm 9: Implicit Lockdown Test in the Cortex-A53 process via the PMU
1 Invalidate all caches.
2 The victim core executes one L2-set-congruent instruction, allocating it to the L1I and L2
cache.
3 The spy core runs an appropriate eviction algorithm for the Cortex-A53 (e.g., 38-2-6).
4 The experimenter pauses code execution immediately before the victim reloads the address.
5 The experimenter records the PMU count of the L1I, L1D, L2, and DRAM accesses and
resumes execution.
6 The victim core reloads the aforementioned instruction address as dataa.
7 The experimenter pauses code execution immediately after the reload instruction and
records PMU counts.
8 Repeat steps 1-7 once, skipping step 3.
9 if The number of DRAM accesses are the same in each iteration then Lockdown is present;
10 else Lockdown is not present;
aIn order to not measure the effects of pipelining, we inserted 10 NOP instructions before and after the reload
instruction. To ensure we only measured exactly the reload instruction, we executed a DSB and ISB instruction
before each set of NOP s.
5.1.3 Cache-timing experiments
On processors which are not supported by the DSTREAM, and as additional confirmation on the
processors that are supported, we ran the cache-timing experiment described in Algorithm 10. By
differentiating the timing between L2, cross-core L1, and DRAM accesses, we are able to determine
the presence of implicit lockdown. If our timing measurements indicate the targeted cache line is
being fetched from the L2 during the reload—after the eviction algorithm is run—then we know
lockdown is present since the address wasn’t evicted. On the other hand, if it is being fetched
from DRAM or another core’s L1, which is only done if not in the L2, then we know lockdown is
not present. In these experiments, both data and instruction addresses are reloaded after eviction
with the LDR instruction. We do not believe it is necessary to reload instructions by executing
them; reloading them as data will still hit the unified L2 cache if the address is present. The code
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we used to measure access times uses the hardware cycle counter via the PMU. This was taken
from [LGS+16]10.
Figure 8a graphs the timing data collected by running two separate data-side executions of
Algorithm 10 on P = 2 cores of the Krait 450. The red lines are when it was run unmodified. The
blue lines are from when it was modified to run without the eviction in step 3, for comparison. In the
latter instance, the memory line remained in the cache, and thus the access time was significantly
faster, as pictured. This can only happen when implicit cache lockdown is not present. Results of
the same setup for the Cortex-A57 are shown in Figure 8b. Since the data from each execution
virtually overlap each other in this graph, it is clear that the memory line is not getting evicted
due to implicit cache lockdown.
(a) Memory access times on the Krait 450. We ran
50000 trials with eviction and 50000 trials without
eviction. An obvious threshold at around 700 cy-
cles can be seen.
(b) Memory access times on the Cortex-A57. We
ran 50000 trials with eviction and 50000 trials
without eviction. There is no significant differ-
ence in cycle counts between these sets of trials,
indicating there is actually no eviction.
Figure 8: Memory access histograms of Algorithm 10 when run on processors with and without
implicit cache lockdown. The red lines represent access times after the eviction pattern was run.
The blue lines represent access times when the eviction pattern was not run, for comparison. There
is no difference between these access times in processors with implicit cache lockdown because the
memory cannot actually be evicted.
This experiment was run on all five processors on the data-side and the instruction-side. We
found that lockdown does not exist at all on the ARM-based Krait 450. The results for the other
four processors were the same as before, thus serving as additional confirmation. These results are
tabulated in Table 3.
10The root github page is https://github.com/IAIK/armageddon
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Algorithm 10: Implicit Lockdown Test via timing analysis
Input:
N , number of ways in L1 sets for given CPU
P , number of cores being tested
1 Invalidate all caches.
2 Cores 1..P − 1 each access N unique set-congruent addresses.
3 Core P runs an appropriate eviction pattern for the given processor.
4 Cores 1..P − 1 each measure the time to reload their N unique set-congruent addresses.
5 Repeat steps 1-4 enough times (e.g., 5000) to remove noise and see clear thresholds between
L2, cross-L1, and DRAM accesses.
6 if Timing results indicate reload comes from L2 then Lockdown is present;
7 else Lockdown is not present;
5.2 Discussion
Implicit cache lockdown was initially a surprising behavior to have discovered. We speculate this
may be how the cache controller guarantees the cache inclusiveness property after the initial linefills
into the L1 and L2. Since the only way for the locked down line to be evicted is either by the same
core or a privileged cache maintenance instruction (both of which will affect the entire hierarchy),
there is no additional logic needed to maintain inclusion between cache levels. It also introduces
a type of fairness mechanism regarding core cache usage; implicit lockdown allows for any core to
place information in the inclusive L1 cache and LLC, without the possibility of said data to be
evicted by cache usage of other cores. In essence, this prevents one overly busy core from being able
to monopolize the cache, as all cores are guaranteed at least some space in the L2 (equal to the L1
associativity). If this were not the case, since most L1 caches have very low associativity (usually
between 2 and 4 ways), if a busy core were to monopolize the L2 cache, other cores would only
have 2-4 L1 cache slots before needing to access DRAM. This could be significantly detrimental
to performance. In most SoCs, we note implicit lockdown affects up to only half the LLC between
all cores. This allows for the non-inclusive cache to still use the other half. An exception to this
is in the Samsung Exynos 5422, in which the quad A7s could lockdown the entire the 8-way LLC.
The existence of this undocumented, implicit lockdown behavior affects the plausibility and
effectiveness of existing cache-timing attacks on ARM processors; it serves as a hidden, possibly
accidental countermeasure. We believe this may be one of the reasons there has been so few
successful attacks on ARM devices until recently. The Cortex-A7 was first revealed in 2011,
meaning implicit lockdown has remained undiscovered for at least five years, as of writing. It is
possible this behavior is present in even older processors.
5.2.1 Implications on Cache Attacks
In the context of cache-attacks, since the locked down ways in the shared L2 cache are not able
to be evicted, the adversary cannot determine if the victim core has accessed sensitive data or
executed sensitive instructions. This thus blocks a fundamental step in all of the cache-timing
38
attacks that do not use a flush instruction. We summarize the effect of implicit lockdown on each
cache-timing attack in Table 4.
Table 4: Effect of implicit lockdown on cache-timing attacks
Attack Same-core Cross-core Cross-CPU
Evict + Time No effect Fully obstructed Fully obstructed
Prime + Probe No effect Fully obstructed Fully obstructed
Flush + Reload (ARMv8 only) No effect No effect No effect
Evict + Reload No effect Fully obstructed Fully obstructed
Flush + Flush (ARMv8 only) No effect No effect No effect
Although implicit lockdown only seems to affect inclusive caches, it still poses an overwhelming
impedance to these cache attacks. When not used in a same-core environment, Evict+Time,
Prime+Probe, and Evict+Reload require cache inclusion, as they must influence the victim core’s
L1 cache11. Cache inclusion is required since the only non-core-specific cache, i.e., the only victim-
relevant cache the attacker can directly influence, is the LLC. The attacker must rely on the cache
controller to evict the targeted address from upper level, core-internal caches when she evicts
it from the LLC, which it does to maintain the guaranteed inclusiveness property. Since implicit
lockdown prevents the attacker from evicting other-core-inclusive lines from the LLC, these attacks
work only in the notoriously unrealistic same-core case.
Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush will work unhindered by implicit cache lockdown because
they do not rely on eviction or inclusiveness, but these attacks are less applicable on ARM devices.
Since there is no unprivileged, full-hierarchy flush instruction available on ARMv7 and previous
architectures, attackers on these platforms can only use the obstructed cache-attacks. While
ARMv8 does introduce a full-hierarchy flush instruction, it is only accessible in userspace if specific
control bits are set in system registers.
Implicit cache lockdown does not prevent cache-timing attacks on ARM Trustzone. Since the
untrusted operating system can schedule the attacker and victim processes one after another on
the same core, cross-core eviction is not necessary.
5.2.2 Defeating Implicit Cache Lockdown
Like all countermeasures to exploitable attacks, implicit lockdown simply raises the bar for the
attacker. She is not given the privilege of evicting an inclusive core’s information. Instead, the
attacker must now rely on the victim core self-evicting the targeted addresses from its L1 before the
attacker can finish conducting her attack. This could be done by waiting a long enough period of
time such that an OS process is scheduled to run on the victim core and serendipitously self-evicts.
If the attacker can attack more than one cache line at the same time, then there is a significant
chance the OS will self-evict at least one of them in a short amount of time.
Or, the attacker may be able to trigger the victim core to execute code that will result in
self-eviction. For example, if the attacker is performing a cache-timing attack to recover an AES
key through openssl, perhaps the attacker could locate specific set-congruent code or data in the
11There is no point in removing the targeted address from a lower level cache if not also removing it from a higher
level cache, because the higher level cache will always be checked first.
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openssl library and manipulate the victim to access it. Or, if the attacker is communicating to the
victim over a socket, perhaps enough socket transmissions will result in the victim self-evicting the
targeted sets.
In these cases, since we are relying on self-eviction and not cross-core eviction, the inclusiveness
requirement of Evict+Time, Prime+Probe, and Evict+Reload is no longer necessary. This means
both the L1D and L1I can be attacked regardless of which one is inclusive.
Of course, there is always the option for an attacker to target ARM-based processors that do not
feature implicit cache lockdown. We discovered that although the Qualcomm Snapdragon Krait
450 has architectural similarities to the Cortex-A processors, it is lacking implicit lockdown. It is
likely that other ARM-based processors also lack lockdown. Or, similarly, the attacker can choose
a SoC that features an ARMv8 processor and allows userspace access to the flush instruction by
default.
The ARMageddon paper [LGS+16] was the first to attack ARM devices using the aforemen-
tioned cache attacks. Among solving the known challenges needed to apply these attacks on ARM,
they also, possibly unknowingly, defeated implicit cache lockdown. They used three test devices:
the OnePlus One, the Alcatel One Touch Pop 2, and the Samsung Galaxy S6. Respectively, these
phones feature the Krait 400, the Cortex-A53, and a big.LITTLE configuration of the Cortex-A53
and Cortex-A57. In the first case, we believe the Krait 400, like the Krait 450 we experimented on,
does not feature implicit lockdown. In the second case, we believe they relied on self-eviction in the
victim core to successfully execute cross-core attacks. Indeed, in discussing their cross-core eviction
strategy on this processor, they mention “the probability that an address is evicted from L1 due
system activity is very high”12, though it is not clear if they are referring to the attacking core, the
victim core, or both. Since they evict instructions from the instruction-inclusive L2 cache using
data accesses from a different core, which we have found to be impossible on the Cortex-A53, they
must have relied on self-eviction in the victim core. The third and final test device that [LGS+16]
used was the Samsung Galaxy S6, which although has Cortex-A53 and A57 processors, has the
full-hierarchy userspace flush instruction available by default. Thus, they simply bypassed implicit
cache lockdown by flushing cache lines instead of evicting them.
Zhang, et al., in [ZXZ16], also feature processors equipped with implicit lockdown. Coinci-
dentally, they use the same processors with which we experimented, namely, the Cortex-A7, A15,
A53, A57, and the Krait 450. Since their work was focused solely on Flush+Reload, one of the
two cache attacks unaffected by lockdown, they did not run into any issues with it. However,
they did ascertain the lack of a full-hierarchy userspace flush instruction in ARMv7. Despite using
a Samsung Galaxy S6, which [LGS+16] indicated has enabled userspace access to cache mainte-
nance operations, they restricted themselves to using only the Android-provided cacheflush syscall,
which they refer to as “clearcache”. One of the main contributions of the work was to execute an
instruction-side Flush+Reload, meaning they would not access data but instead execute particular
instructions to fill the cache with addresses. This contribution stemmed from using cacheflush,
because it only invalidates the instruction side. Indeed, their experiments only succeeded when
12This quote is actually taken from Lipp’s Master Thesis [Lip16], which is based on the same work as [LGS+16],
and features an almost identical but slightly less descriptive explanation.
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using the ARMv8 instruction-inclusive Cortex-A53 processor13.
13Surprisingly, this work concluded that all of the L1 caches—instruction and data—in the aforementioned proces-
sors, are inclusive. This contradicts our own experiments that found the Cortex-A7 and A53 to only be inclusive on
the instruction side, and the A15 and A57 inclusive only on the data-side. Further, the official ARM documentation
on the A7, for example, explains “Data is only allocated to the L2 cache when evicted from the L1 memory system,
not when first fetched from the system.” We understand this to mean it is not data-inclusive.
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis, we discussed implicit cache lockdown, an undocumented behavior found in several
modern multicore ARM processors. This behavior prevents one core from evicting a cache line
from the LLC if the same line is present in another core’s inclusive L1 cache. We speculate this
behavior was introduced for performance reasons, as it obviates the need for additional hardware
and logic to enforce cache inclusiveness, among other reasons. However, a possibly unintended
side effect of implicit cache lockdown is that it acts as a countermeasure to several existing cache-
timing side-channel attacks. This is because the affected attacks precisely rely on the ability for
an attacking core to evict cache lines from the LLC; they leverage the inclusiveness property such
that the cache controller will evict the same lines from the victim’s inclusive upper level cache.
This, along with the obvious timing differences between cache and DRAM accesses, thus gives the
attacker insight into what data and instructions the victim core is accessing (when lockdown is not
present). While there are cache attacks that remain unaffected by implicit lockdown, these attacks
require a userspace cache flush instruction which has only been included in the newest, ARMv8
processors, and still it must explicitly be enabled. As a countermeasure to these attacks, however,
it can be relatively easily defeated. In fact, there has already been work that does so [LGS+16],
possibly without understanding the underlying behavior. In short, the attacker must now induce
or wait for the victim core to self-evict the targeted cache line before she can evict it from the
LLC, which may happen in a matter of seconds on modern operating systems due to background
OS activity.
So far, we have found implicit cache lockdown to exist in most ARM Cortex processors since the
Cortex-A7, which dates back half a decade. In experiments with Qualcomm’s Krait 450 processor,
which borrows ARM’s instruction set architecture but uses its own, distinct microarchitecture
design, evidence showed that implicit lockdown was not present.
However, there is still more work to be done. We would like to learn the extent to which
implicit cache lockdown affects other ARM and ARM-based processors. This can be done by simply
acquiring and applying our methodology to more ARM-based embedded devices. We also believe
there is likely an algorithm that attackers can incorporate into their attacks to systematically
circumvent implicit cache lockdown; we do not think it was intended to serve as a legitimate cache-
timing defense. Specifically, simultaneously attacking a processor-dependent number of victim
cache lines may increase the probability of OS-induced self-eviction to high enough levels to thwart
implicit cache lockdown.
42
References
[A15] Cortex-a15 mpcore revision: r4p0 technical reference manual. http:
//infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0438i/DDI0438I_cortex_
a15_r4p0_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2016-11-21.
[A53a] Answered by the experts: Arms´ cortex a53 lead archi-
tect, peter greenhalgh. http://www.anandtech.com/show/7591/
answered-by-the-experts-arms-cortex-a53-lead-architect-peter-greenhalgh.
Published: 2013-12-17.
[A53b] Cortex-a53 mpcore processor revision: r0p4 technical reference manual.
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0500g/DDI0500G_
cortex_a53_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2016-11-21.
[A57] Cortex-a57 mpcore processor revision: r1p3 technical reference manual.
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0488h/DDI0488H_
cortex_a57_mpcore_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2016-11-21.
[A72] Cortex-a72 mpcore processor revision: r0p3 technical reference manual.
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.100095_0003_05_en/
cortex_a72_mpcore_trm_100095_0003_05_en.pdf. Accessed: 2016-11-21.
[A7T] Cortex-a7 mpcore revision: r0p5 technical reference manual. http:
//infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0464f/DDI0464F_cortex_
a7_mpcore_r0p5_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2016-11-21.
[Acı] Onur Acıic¸mez. Yet Another MicroArchitectural Attack: Exploiting I-Cache. In
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Computer Security Architecture.
[ARMa] Arm cortex-a series programmers guide for armv8-a, v1.0. http://infocenter.arm.
com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0024a/DEN0024A_v8_architecture_PG.pdf.
Accessed: 2016-12-20.
[ARMb] Armv8 architecture reference manual. https://static.docs.arm.com/ddi0487/a/
DDI0487A_k_armv8_arm_iss10775.pdf. Accessed: 2016-12-31.
[Ber04] Daniel J. Bernstein. Cache-timing attacks on AES, 2004. URL:
http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#cachetiming.
[BvdPSY14] Naomi Benger, Joop van de Pol, Nigel P. Smart, and Yuval Yarom. “Ooh Aah... Just
a Little Bit”: A Small Amount of Side Channel Can Go a Long Way. In CHES, pages
75–92, 2014.
[CPU] Latency numbers every programmer should know. https://people.eecs.
berkeley.edu/~rcs/research/interactive_latency.html. Accessed: 2016-11-18.
43
[exy] Samsung exynos 5 dual (exynos 5250) user’s manual. http://www.arndaleboard.
org/wiki/downloads/supports/Exynos_5_Dual_User_Manaul_Public_REV1.00.
pdf. Published: Oct. 2012.
[Fan] Fangfei Liu and Yuval Yarom and Qian Ge and Gernot Heiser and Ruby B. Lee. Last
level cache side channel attacks are practical. In S&P 2015.
[FPT07] Heiko Falk, Sascha Plazar, and Henrik Theiling. Compile-time decided instruction
cache locking using worst-case execution paths. In Proceedings of the 5th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis,
CODES+ISSS ’07, pages 143–148, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[GBK] David Gullasch, Endre Bangerter, and Stephan Krenn. Cache Games – Bringing
Access-Based Cache Attacks on AES to Practice. SP ’11, pages 490–505.
[GMF+16] Daniel Gruss, Cle´mentine Maurice, Anders Fogh, Moritz Lipp, and Stefan Mangard.
Prefetch side-channel attacks: Bypassing smap and kernel aslr. In Proceedings of the
2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS
’16, pages 368–379, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[GMWM16] Daniel Gruss, Cle´mentine Maurice, Klaus Wagner, and Stefan Mangard.
Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack, pages 279–299. Springer Inter-
national Publishing, Cham, 2016.
[GSM15] Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, and Stefan Mangard. Cache template attacks: Au-
tomating attacks on inclusive last-level caches. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 15), pages 897–912, Washington, D.C., August 2015. USENIX
Association.
[Hu] Wei-Ming Hu. Lattice Scheduling and Covert Channels. In Proceedings of the 1992
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[IES] Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. S$A: A Shared Cache Attack
that Works Across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing and its Application to AES. In
36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2015).
[IES16] Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. Cross processor cache attacks.
In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Commu-
nications Security, ASIA CCS ’16. ACM, 2016.
[I˙GI+16] Mehmet Sinan I˙nci, Berk Gulmezoglu, Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk
Sunar. Cache Attacks Enable Bulk Key Recovery on the Cloud. 2016.
[IIES14] Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan I˙ncI˙, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. Wait a
Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES. In RAID, pages 299–319, 2014.
44
[IIES15] Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan I˙ncI˙, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. Lucky 13
strikes back. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer
and Communications Security, ASIA CCS ’15, pages 85–96, 2015.
[int] Intel 64 and ia-32 architectures optimization reference manual. http:
//www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/
64-ia-32-architectures-optimization-manual.pdf. Accessed: 2016-12-24.
[Kah] Jeremy Kahn. Arm sales soar ahead of $32 billion softbank
takeover. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-27/
arm-revenue-grows-on-higher-end-processors-licensing-deals. Published:
2016-7-27.
[kra] Qualcomm’s new snapdragon s4: Msm8960 & krait ar-
chitecture explored. http://www.anandtech.com/show/4940/
qualcomm-new-snapdragon-s4-msm8960-krait-architecture/2. Published:
Oct. 2011.
[LGS+16] Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, Cle´mentine Maurice, and Stefan Man-
gard. Armageddon: Cache attacks on mobile devices. In 25th USENIX Security Sym-
posium (USENIX Security 16), pages 549–564, Austin, TX, August 2016. USENIX
Association.
[Lip16] Moritz Lipp. Cache attacks on arm. Master’s thesis, Graz, University
of Technology, 2016. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/
eu-16-Lipp-ARMageddon-How-Your-Smartphone-CPU-Breaks-Software-Level-Security-And-Privacy-wp.
pdf.
[NS07] Michael Neve and Jean-Pierre Seifert. Advances on Access-Driven Cache Attacks on
AES. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 4356 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 147–162. 2007.
[OKSK15] Yossef Oren, Vasileios P. Kemerlis, Simha Sethumadhavan, and Angelos D.
Keromytis. The spy in the sandbox: Practical cache attacks in javascript and their
implications. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’15, pages 1406–1418, New York, NY, USA,
2015. ACM.
[OST06] Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer. Cache Attacks and Countermeasures:
The Case of AES, pages 1–20. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006.
[Pag02] D. Page. Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel, 2002.
[PGM+16] Peter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Cle´mentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz, and Stefan Man-
gard. Drama: Exploiting dram addressing for cross-cpu attacks. In 25th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16), pages 565–581, Austin, TX, August
2016. USENIX Association.
45
[PKMF12] Sascha Plazar, Jan C. Kleinsorge, Peter Marwedel, and Heiko Falk. Wcet-aware static
locking of instruction caches. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium
on Code Generation and Optimization, CGO ’12, pages 44–52, New York, NY, USA,
2012. ACM.
[RTSS] Thomas Ristenpart, Eran Tromer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. Hey, you,
get off of my cloud: Exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds. In
Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS ’09, pages 199–212.
[SCM+14] Lui Sha, Marco Caccamo, Renato Mancuso, Jung-Eun Kim, Rodolfo Yoon, Man-
Ki; Pellizzoni, Heechul Yun, Russel Kegley, Dennis Perlman, Greg Arundale, and
Richard Bradford. Single core equivalent virtual machines for hard realtime comput-
ing on multicore processors. Technical report, University of Illinois, 2014.
[TSSS03] Yukiyasu Tsunoo, Teruo Saito, Tomoyasu Suzaki, and Maki Shigeri. Cryptanalysis
of DES implemented on computers with cache. In Proc. of CHES 2003, Springer
LNCS, pages 62–76, 2003.
[WHKA13] B. C. Ward, J. L. Herman, C. J. Kenna, and J. H. Anderson. Outstanding paper
award: Making shared caches more predictable on multicore platforms. In 2013 25th
Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems, pages 157–167, July 2013.
[YF14] Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. Flush+reload: A high resolution, low noise, l3
cache side-channel attack. In Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Conference on Security
Symposium, SEC’14, pages 719–732, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2014. USENIX Association.
[YGH16] Yuval Yarom, Daniel Genkin, and Nadia Heninger. Cachebleed: A timing attack
on openssl constant time RSA. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- CHES 2016 - 18th International Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August
17-19, 2016, Proceedings, pages 346–367, 2016.
[ZJOR] Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Alina Oprea, and Michael K. Reiter. HomeAlone: Co-
residency Detection in the Cloud via Side-Channel Analysis. In Proceedings of the
2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[ZJRRa] Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart. Cross-tenant
side-channel attacks in paas clouds. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security.
[ZJRRb] Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart. Cross-VM
Side Channels and Their Use to Extract Private Keys. In Proceedings of the 2012
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
[ZXZ16] Xiaokuan Zhang, Yuan Xiao, and Yinqian Zhang. Return-oriented flush-reload side
channels on arm and their implications for android devices. In Proceedings of the
46
2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS
’16, pages 858–870, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
47
